UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
Randy E. Barnett*
In his forthcoming article, Original Meaning and Abortion,1 Jack Balkin
makes the startling disclosure that he is now an originalist. “[C]onstitutional
interpretation,” he writes, “requires fidelity to the original meaning of the
Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text. The task of interpretation is
to look to original meaning and underlying principle and decide how best to apply
them in current circumstances. I call this the method of text and principle.”2
This is big. Jack Balkin is one of the most consistently creative and
innovative progressive constitutional law theorists of our day. That he has been
pulled by the gravitational force of originalism is a major development. I know what
that force feels like.
My Path to Originalism: Lysander Spooner
All the time I was doing my earliest writings on the Ninth Amendment and
the Second Amendment, I considered myself a nonoriginalist. I concurred with the
standard criticisms of originalism that were widely accepted by constitutional
scholars: interpreting the Constitution according to the original intentions of the
Framers was impractical, illegitimate, and contrary to the intentions of the Framers
themselves. Nevertheless, I continued to research and write about the original
meaning of the text, which continued to seem salient to me and many others.
Then, quite by serendipity, I came across a reference to Lysander Spooner’s
1845 book, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery,3 in an anthology edited by Sandy
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Levinson.4 Having been a fan since college of Spooner’s 1870 essay, No Treason:
The Constitution of No Authority,5 my curiosity was piqued. When I looked at
Spooner’s monograph on slavery, I discovered an approach to constitutional
interpretation I had not before considered.
Spooner’s was responding to the argument of the Garrisonian abolitionists
that the Constitution was “a covenant with death and an agreement with hell”
because it sanctioned slavery. In particular, he was answering a pamphlet by radical
abolitionist lawyer Wendell Phillips entitled, The Constitution: A Pro-Slavery
Compact.6 Phillips had presented excerpts from the recently-disclosed notes of the
constitutional convention by James Madison as proof that the Framers had intended
to protect the institution of slavery in several passages of the Constitution, passages
that seem to allude to the matter without using the term “slavery” or “slave.”
In reply, Spooner maintained that the Constitution should be interpreted
according to its public meaning at the time it was enacted. As Spooner argued:
W e must admit that the constitution, of itself, independently of the actual intentions
of the people, expresses some certain fixed, definite, and legal intentions; else the
people themselves would express no intentions by agreeing to it. The instrument
would, in fact, contain nothing that the people could agree to. Agreeing to an
7
instrument that had no meaning of its own, would only be agreeing to nothing.

How then is the Constitution's meaning to be determined? “[T]he only answer
that can be given,” Spooner concluded,
is, that it can be no other than the meaning which its words, interpreted by sound
legal rules of interpretation, express. That and that alone is the meaning of the
constitution. And whether the people who adopted the constitution really meant the
same things which the constitution means, is a matter which they were bound to
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settle, each individual with himself, before he agreed to the instrument; and it is
therefore one with which we have now nothing to do.8

Any secret intentions not embodied in the text itself were not binding on later
interpreters:
The intentions of the framers of the constitution . . . have nothing to do with fixing
the legal meaning of the constitution. That convention were not delegated to adopt
or establish a constitution; but only to consult, devise and recommend. The
instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, having no legal
force or authority. It finally derived all its validity and obligation, as a frame of
9
government, from its adoption by the people at large.

Since the Framers had chosen to use euphemisms for slavery, interpreters were
obligated to give these terms their ordinary public meaning, rather than the meaning
they would have only if one already knows from extrinsic information that they were
intended to refer to slavery.
In addition, Spooner offered a theory of constitutional legitimacy that was
startlingly modern in its reliance on hypothetical consent given the impossibility of
and literal consent by the people.
Our constitutions purport to be established by “the people,” and, in theory, “all the
people” consent to such government as the constitutions authorize. But this consent
of “the people” exists only in theory. It has no existence in fact. Government is in
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reality established by the few; and these few assume the consent of all the rest,
10
without any such consent being actually given.

Spooner then made a crucial move: The inevitable fact that actual consent is
lacking limits the government to exercising only those powers to which every honest
person could be presumed to have consented.
All governments . . . that profess to be founded on the consent of the governed, and
yet have authority to violate natural laws, are necessarily frauds. It is not a
supposable case, that all or even a very large part, of the governed, can have agreed
to them. Justice is evidently the only principle that everybody can be presumed to
11
agree to, in the formation of government.

Finally, given this account of legitimacy, Spooner supplemented his original
public meaning approach to constitutional interpretation with a rule of constitutional
construction he borrowed from a “clear statement” rule for statutory construction that
had been enunciated by John Marshall:
W here rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the
general system of laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed
with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect
12
such objects.

According to Spooner, where there is a choice between an innocent public
meaning, and an idiocyncratic and manifestly unjust meaning provable only by
reference to original intentions, constitutional legitimacy required the adoption of the
innocent meaning. Spooner’s formulated the interpretive maxim as follows:
1st, that no intention, in violation of natural justice and natural right . . . can be
ascribed to the constitution, unless that intention be expressed in terms that are
legally competent to express such an intention; and 2d, that no terms, except those
that are plenary, express, explicit, distinct, unequivocal, and to which no other
meaning can be given, are legally competent to authorize or sanction anything
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contrary to natural right. 13

Spooner’s arguments eventually persuaded Frederick Douglass famously to reverse
his position on the constitutionality of slavery.14 Modern readers might pause for a
moment to contemplate the sophistication of Spooner’s argument.
This first encounter with original public meaning interpretation was an eyeopener for me. It seemed to avoid many, if not all, of the objections then being made
against originalism based on original framers’ intention or original ratifiers’
understanding. Eventually, I came to the conclusion that, given a commitment to a
written constitution and a correct view of constitutional legitimacy, original public
meaning originalism was the best way to approach constitutional interpretation. In
my Brendan Brown Lecture at Loyola University of New Orleans, I dubbed this
approach, “An originalism for nonoriginalists,” because it seemed to me that this
version of originalism had a lot to offer to many constitutional scholars who, like me,
considered themselves nonoriginalists.15
Now Jack Balkin has reached the same conclusion. I would like to think
that, over the years, he was influenced by Frederick Douglass’s 1860 Glasgow lecture
on the unconstitutionality of slavery, which is given prominence in the casebook by
Brest, Levinson, Balkin and Amar. In his speech, Douglass employs a Spoonerian
public meaning approach. If confronting Douglass’s arguments in the classroom did
indeed contribute to Balkin’s move to original public meaning originalism, then
Lysander Spooner has struck again.
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Balkin’s Originalism: Text and Principle
In his article, Balkin contends that the “choice between original meaning and
living constitutionalism . . . is a false choice.”16 He specifically subscribes to the
version of originalism based on “original meaning” rather than on either Framers’
intent or ratifiers’ understanding, although he freely acknowledges, as well he should,
that evidence of the intentions of the Framers and ratifiers is often highly relevant to
determining the public meaning of the words they decided to enact. To avoid
confusion, it is useful to note that the difference among these methods of
interpretation is defined, not by the evidence each includes or excludes from its
analysis, but by what each method is trying to prove or disprove by use of evidence.
Balkin sharply criticizes the approach to originalism of Justice Scalia, and
others, who limit original meaning to the “expected applications” of the more
abstract provisions to the problems of the day, and who then qualify their
commitment to originalism to avoid objectionable results by selectively adhering to
nonoriginalists precedents.17 Although Justice Scalia deserves much credit for
shifting the focus of originalists away from Framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions to the
public meaning of the text,18 in my view, Balkin’s critique is telling and correct.19
Unlike the process of determining original public meaning, in all but the rarest of
cases, limiting the more abstract provisions of the Constitution to their “expected
application” is not an historical question. It calls instead for us to ask, how the
Framers would have expected the text to apply to concrete cases, which is a
counterfactual rather than a factual inquiry. I have dubbed this approach “channeling
the Framers.”
Balkin’s “text and principle” approach to originalism is, he contends,
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Balkin, supra note 1, at ___.
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See id. at ___.
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See e.g. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the
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I N TERPRETATIO N : F ED ERAL C O U RTS AN D THE L AW 38 (Amy Gutman, ed., 1997)(“W hat I look for in
the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the
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For my critique of Justice Scalia’s approach, which I conclude cannot accurately claim to
be originalist, see Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism, 75
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faithful to the original meaning of the constitutional text, and the purposes of those
who adopted it. It is also consistent with a basic law whose reach and application
evolve over time, a basic law that leaves to each generation the task of how to make
sense of the Constitution's words and principles. Although the constitutional text
and principles do not change without subsequent amendment, their application and
implementation can. That is the best way to understand the interpretive practices
of our constitutional tradition and the work of the many political and social
movements that have transformed our understandings of the Constitution’s
20
guarantees.

He then applies his approach to the constitutionality under the Fourteenth
Amendment of governmental bans on abortion.
I am in agreement with nearly everything Balkin says about original meaning
originalism in the Part II of his article. I am also sympathetic with his conclusions
about the unconstitutionality of prohibitions on abortion, but will not address the
substance of this issue here. Discerning and applying the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a tricky business and I intend to do more work on this
subject in the future. For one thing, originalism properly done requires a careful
attention to evidence; it is not enough that a particular interpretation is a plausible fit
with the text.
In the balance of this comment, I merely express a caution about one facet of
originalist methodology: the relationship between the text of the Constitution and the
principles that underlie it. I will explain why the differing ways they conceive of this
relationship distinguishes originalists from living constitutionalists. Balkin’s
treatment of this issue may unintentionally blur this still-useful line.
Two Uses of Underlying Principles
There are two ways to relate underlying principles to text, one that is a vital
part of an originalist method of interpretation and another that is a negation of
originalism. Unfortunately, it is very easy to slip from one to the other without
realizing it. It happens all the time.
In a crucial passage, Balkin describes the move to underlying principles when
interpreting a text. It is worth quoting at length:
Underlying principles are necessary to constitutional interpretation when we face
a relatively abstract constitutional command rather than language that offers a fairly
concrete rule, like the requirement that there are two houses of Congress or that the

20
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President must be 35 years of age. When the text is relatively rule-like, concrete
and specific, the underlying principles cannot override the textual command. For
example, the underlying goal of promoting maturity in a President does not mean
that we can dispense with the 35 year age requirement. But where the text is
abstract, general or offers a standard, we must look to the principles that underlie
the text to make sense of and apply it. Because the text points to general and
abstract concepts, these underlying principles will usually also be general and
abstract. Indeed, the fact that adopters choose text that features general and abstract
concepts is normally the best evidence that they sought to embody general and
abstract principles of constitutional law, whose scope, in turn, will have to be
fleshed out later on by later generations. Nevertheless recourse to underlying
principles limits the direction and application of the text and therefore is essential
to fidelity to the Constitution.

21

In this passage, Balkin correctly describes the relationship between text and
underlying principle: given the underdeterminacy of language,22 a resort to
underlying principles is sometimes needed to discern the original meaning of the text
but cannot be used to contradict or change that meaning. Although, in this passage,
he seems to imply that only “[w]hen the text is relatively rule-like, concrete and
specific, the underlying principles cannot override the textual command,” I doubt this
is the meaning he intended. To be faithful to the text and principle, as opposed to
text or principle, underlying principles can never be used to override a textual
command. Rather, I take Balkin to mean that, discerning the original meaning of the
more abstract provisions of the text requires a greater reliance upon the principles
that underlying these provisions.
To remain faithful to the Constitution when referring to underlying principles,
we must never forget it is a text we are expounding. And it is the text, properly
interpreted and specified in light of its underlying principles, not the underlying
principles themselves, that are to be applied to changing facts and circumstances by
means of constitutional doctrines. When you need to penetrate beneath the surface
of the text to the principles that lie underneath, you must reemerge through the text.
In other words, it is not the underlying principles that are applied to present
circumstances but the original meaning of the text interpreted in light of these
principles.
There is another highly familiar and very nonoriginalist way to see the
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relationship between “text and principle”: One could discern the principles
underlying the text, and then apply these principles directly to new circumstances.
By so doing, one can end up potentially expanding the reach of, and even
contravening, the text itself.
For example, assuming that the original meaning of “the right to keep and
bear arms”23 in the Second Amendment refers to an individual right,24 one could
nevertheless identify the principle underlying the Second Amendment as the
maintenance of public safety. Given the increased lethality of modern weaponry and
our changed understanding about the relationship between firearms and public safety,
it might then be contended that the underlying principle of the Second Amendment
is best served by the prohibiting the private ownership of firearms. This use of
underlying principles would then justify contradicting the text rather than interpreting
and applying it. Put another way, this resort to underlying principles is not really a
faithful interpretation of the text but is an all-too-familiar way of obviating textual
commands.
Although I think that Balkin would reject this move, his article may invite
some confusion on this point. The first source of possible confusion arises when he
contends that “we do not face a choice between living constitutionalism and fidelity
to the original meaning of the text. The two are opposite sides of the same coin.”25
The term “living Constitution” was coined to justify abandoning or contradicting the
text in favor of applying the principles underlying the text to new facts and changing
circumstances. Living constitutionalism’s claim to fidelity rests on its claim to be
faithfully applying the enduring principles of the Constitution to new circumstances,
even where ignoring or abandoning what it views as the archaic original text.
I believe that Balkin is revising or reinterpreting “living constitutionalism”
so as to render it consistent with originalism — something I do myself — but this
maneuver could easily be missed by uncareful readers, who may be happy to claim
the mantle of “originalist” while preserving an unvarnished living constitutionalism.
I do not believe that this is Balkin’s endeavor, though I predict that other originalists
may well make this charge. And they may do so because of how Balkin goes about
analyzing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

23

U.S. C O N ST . A M EN D . II.
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An obviously highly contested assumption. See Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 T EX . L. R EV . 237 (2004).
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In his discussion of abortion, Balkin is much more careful than most to bring
the entire text of the Fourteenth Amendment to bear on the problem he is addressing,
including the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and he presents important evidence
of its original meaning. After identifying the principles underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment as a whole as “equal citizenship, equal civil rights, and civil equality for
all citizens of the United States,”26 he then proceeds to apply the principle of “equal
citizenship” directly to the problem of women’s rights in general and abortion rights
in particular. The following passages are representative of the tenor of his analysis:
“laws criminalizing abortion violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s principle of equal
citizenship”27; “that laws that discriminate against women violate basic principles of
equal citizenship in our Constitution.”28 Indeed, I count 24 references to “equal
citizenship” in the article.
But there is no free floating “Equal Citizenship Clause” in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 1 contains four moving parts that must carefully be considered
and applied in light of their underlying principles. There is a Citizenship Clause that
extends citizenship to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof”29—a very important piece of text in the abortion
context, as Balkin correctly explains. There is the Privileges or Immunities Clause
that protects the “privileges or immunities” of all citizens, including women from
being abridged by the making or enforcing of a state law. There is the Due Process
Clause that addresses the deprivations of life, liberty and property.30 And there is the
Equal Protection Clause, that provides all persons, male and female, whether citizens
or not, with “the equal protection of the laws”31—laws that, presumably, do not on

26
Balkin, supra note 1, at ___. T he whole passage well exemplifies this approach: “The
purpose of the Citizenship, Privileges or Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses, and indeed of the
entire Fourteenth Amendment, was to secure equal citizenship, equal civil rights, and civil equality
for all citizens of the United States.” Id.
27

Id. at __.

28

Id. at __.

29

U.S. C O N ST ., A M EN D . XIV, sec. 1.

30

On its face, this clause seems to refer to the three forms of legal sanctions that ordinarily
result from the application of laws to persons in the judicial process: One can be put to death (“life”),
enjoined or imprisoned (“liberty”), or subjected to money damages or a fine (“property”). See id.
31

Id.
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their face violate the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.
It seems quite plain that, unlike Section 2, the original public meaning of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is gender neutral. To apply it to particular
cases requires the identification of those privileges or immunities enjoyed by all
citizens, regardless of gender. And this would include, I would maintain, the natural
right to control one’s body, including one’s reproductive processes, even against a
competing moral concern for the unborn who, at least in the early stages of
pregnancy, are neither “citizens” nor “persons” under the original meaning of the
Constitution.
It is not my objective to present here a compelling originalist case for abortion
rights. The matter is complicated by the need to interpret what it means to “abridge”
the privileges or immunities of citizens. The last two paragraphs are offered solely
to illustrate that, to the extent one needs to refer to an underlying principle of “equal
citizenship,” an originalist must then resurface through the text itself, which then gets
applied to the problem at hand. I am concerned that Balkin’s extensive use of the
equal citizenship principle divorced from text is a remnant his former days as a living
constitutionalist. Old habits die hard, and this particular habit is a very tough one to
kick.
Conclusion
I do not believe that Jack Balkin is trying to pull a fast one. I do not believe
his aim is to steal or Balkinize the mantle of “originalism” and cleverly flip it to
mean nothing more than the living constitutionalism beloved by so many
constitutional scholars. I believe he is sincere in his embrace of original meaning
originalism, and I share his belief that many, though not all, of the most cherished
progressive results can be supported by a proper use of this methodology. He just
needs to be a bit more sensitive about how principles work with, rather then undercut,
text in an originalist “text and principles” approach. In its present form, however,
Balkin’s article is likely to confuse both originalists and nonoriginalists alike. And
that would be a genuine pity.

